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Abstract
The left–right line of conflict has been the dominant dimension of decision-making in the
European Parliament since 1979. A pro-/anti-European Union integration dimension is
of secondary importance. Limited evidence exists on the conditions under which these
different dimensions matter. This study examines parliamentary decision-making about
the so-called Two-Pack, which moved responsibilities about budgetary decision-making
to the European Commission. The article uses in-depth interviews, textual analysis of
committee debates and roll call voting analysis in order to determine which lines of
conflict matter at which stage of decision-making. The evidence indicates that left–right
division is dominant in the informal stage preceding committee debates, while both the
pro-/anti-European Union and the left/right dimensions matter during the committee
stage, whereas for plenary votes, the pro-/anti-European Union dimension is crucial.
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Introduction
For a long time, the European Parliament (EP) has suﬀered from a lack of sub-
stantive political competition (Mair, 2007). The two big groups in a so-called
‘Grand Coalition’ took most decisions consensually (Kreppel and Tsebelis,
1999). In the last decades, scholars have pointed a shift towards contested deci-
sion-making in the EP, fuelling hopes for ‘limited democratic politics’ (Hix, 2008,
2013). Recent studies on party competition in the EP have challenged this hope.
The original shift towards a ‘left–right confrontation’ (Kreppel and Hix, 2003)
seems to have been reversed after the on-set of the eurozone sovereign debt
crisis. One may have expected that the conﬂict between the economic left and
the economic right structures voting in the EP, as the question of austerity-
versus-spending was at the core of the debate after the onset of the eurocrisis.
Otjes and van der Veer (2016), however, found that for voting on economic
issues in the seventh EP, the importance of left–right dimension has decreased
while the signiﬁcance of the pro–anti-European Union (EU) dimension has greatly
increased.
Studies on the internal decision-making in the EP have pointed to the fact that it
builds broad legislative coalitions of the pro-European centrist groups during inter-
institutional conﬂicts (Bressanelli et al., 2016; Hagemann and Høyland, 2010).
Rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs and, on controversial issues, the political
groups build these coalitions during the legislative process (Finke, 2012; Jensen
and Winzen, 2012; Roger and Winzen, 2015). Our central argument is that left–
right conﬂict (despite the evidence of Otjes and van der Veer, 2016) is still present in
the Parliament but that it is present outside the meetings of the plenary, namely in
earlier stages of the decision-making process. Left–right conﬂict structures the
informal pre-committee stage and the committee stage, yet during plenary
voting, a pro-/anti-integration dimension dominates. To substantiate our
argument, we examine the entire decision-making process of a crucial legislative
proposal in the Parliament during the eurocrisis, the ‘Two-Pack’, in detail.
The Two-Pack legislation strengthened the economic coordination at the
European level. In order to contain the European sovereign debt crisis,
the European Union (EU) expanded its control over economic governance at the
expense of national economic governments (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). It
gave the Commission considerable oversight powers over the national budgetary
decision-making of eurozone member states. This legislation, in which the EP was
closely involved, represented an unprecedented move of competences within the
EU (Chalmers, 2012; Majone, 2014; Tosun et al., 2014). Here, we analyse how the
decision-making in the EP took place. Our central research question is which lines
of conﬂict within the EP were dominant at which stage of the legislative process
during the decision-making on the Two-Pack, and why these?
In line with Otjes and van der Veer (2016), we argue that the eurocrisis and
the political reactions to this crisis have strengthened the pro-/anti-integration
dimension. The European Commission pursued the solution of prioritising
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European-level economic governance over national budgetary autonomy (Bauer
and Becker, 2014; Chalmers, 2012; Majone, 2014). Moreover, the EU dealt with the
crisis in an intergovernmental mode, empowering the member states at the expense
of the EP (Schwarzer, 2012). Members of the EP (MEPs) fought to be active in the
legislative decision-making. Consequently, the pro-European groups agreed on a
united position, blurring their ideological divisions (Roger, 2016; Rose and Borz,
2013). Previous research suggests that compromises are built during and before the
committee stage (Bressanelli et al., 2016; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009) A sole
focus on the plenary votes will not suﬃce to capture all conﬂict in the EP
(Bowler and McElroy, 2015; Ringe, 2010). We therefore analyse the dynamics of
decision-making beyond the voting stage. We show that left–right confrontation
occurs at the committee level but is resolved in the informal negotiation process
before the vote takes place. The pro-European centrist groups sought to achieve a
compromise on the Two-Pack that ensured the stability of the European project.
Nevertheless, these groups were divided on central aspects of the legislation and
accordingly had to solve their disagreements before the voting stage.
This study contributes to the existing literature on European politics in four ways.
First, we examine the nature of political conﬂict in both the committee and plenary
phases of the legislating. Analyses of politicization focused on the plenary phase (Hix
et al., 2007; Slapin and Proksch, 2010). However, the committees are important as
most of the legislative work is carried out there (Yordanova, 2013). Studies have
investigated how conﬂicts at the committee level are translated into a united position
for the EP (Ringe, 2010; Roger, 2016). We add to this literature by analysing the
evolving nature of conﬂicts over the diﬀerent phases. Second, interviews with the
decision-makers allow us to explain the coalition-building process. Negotiations
with the Council impact the strategic coalition-building before the voting stage by
centrist, pro-European groups (Bressanelli et al., 2016; Finke, 2012). Our interviews
add to our understanding on how and why these coalitions are built. Third, we study
the ﬁnal votes on two key plenary votes to understand how the committee and
coalition-building processes cumulated. Finally, we add understanding about legis-
lating during EU crises. The crisis has been crucial for the furthering of European
integration, such as the Two-Pack investigated here is clearly a case (Bauer and
Becker, 2014). The eﬀects of the eurocrisis on EP decision-making have not been
examined in-depth (Braghiroli, 2014; Otjes and van der Veer, 2016).
We ﬁnd that the anti-/pro-EU integration dimension is the most important line
of conﬂict during the two plenary votes investigated. Nonetheless, given that the
issue revolves around an economic issue, we do ﬁnd left–right conﬂict, but this
conﬂict primarily occurs in the committee and negotiation phases.
Theorising the lines of conflict in the EP
The extent to which decision-making in the Parliament is and ought to be polar-
ized is a matter of academic debate. The earlier work of Kreppel (2000) has
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pointed at the importance of parliamentary unity for enabling the EP to amend
legislation. Bartolini and Hix (2007) have argued that in order to provide legit-
imacy, EP decision-making has to be politicized. Empirical studies found politics
in the EP to be more politicized (Hix, 2013; Kreppel and Hix, 2003), further
fuelling hope of competitive EP politics. The Lisbon Treaty further enhanced the
tendency towards politicization. It extended the EP’s legislative rights (Hix and
Høyland, 2013). Nevertheless, even though patterns of party politics occur, the
EP still remains a consensual assembly (Bendjaballah, 2011; Bowler and
McElroy, 2015; Roger, 2016). In order to behave as ‘responsible legislator’
(Ripoll Servent, 2013), the Parliament prioritizes agreements with the Council
over politicization (Burns, 2013; Huber and Shackleton, 2013). This focus on
compromise has implications for the democratic representation of citizens.
Rose and Borz (2013: 490) argued that the aggregation of interests into a
united position for the pro-European centrist groups leads to ‘misrepresentation’.
Similarly, Lord (2013: 1069) pointed the risks of ‘consensus decision-rules [that]
constrain how far the EU can develop forms of political competition that oﬀer
public choice and control over the Union’s legislative agenda’ in the ordinary
legislative procedure. Likewise, Ripoll Servent (2013: 983) maintained that
institutional constraints lead to ‘depoliticization’: actors ‘may prefer to sacriﬁce
substantive issues rather than be accused of be ‘‘irresponsible’’’, whereby the
‘weight of compromise and ‘‘responsibility’’ translates into equating ‘‘legislative’’
practices with ‘‘technical’’ negotiations’.
The key argument of our article is that the question of politicization or consen-
sus in the EP is not a black-and-white issue. At diﬀerent phases of decision-making
compromise and consensus may matter more, while at other phases of decision-
making ideological polarization may be more pronounced. Ideological polarization
and conciliatory compromise between the two groups are diﬀerent modes of deci-
sion-making and the EP can ‘shift gears’ between them (Andeweg, 1992). We build
on the idea of Kreppel (2000) that the Grand Coalition waxed and waned during
diﬀerent phases of decision-making. First, we will introduce the diﬀerent lines of
conﬂict that according to previous authors have characterized decision-making in
the EP and then will discuss in greater detail under which conditions what dimen-
sions may matter more or less.
Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) proposed that the dominant line of conﬂict in the EP
may be the economic left/right-dimension. The key question in the Parliament is
what kind of Europe MEPs want. They can choose for government intervention in
the economy (a left-wing Europe) or market-based solutions (a right-wing Europe).
Studies have found that the left–right dimension is the dominant dimension in the
roll-call voting behaviour of MEPs, particularly for economic issues (Hix et al.,
2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999).
H1 (Economic Expectation): Decision-making in the EP follows the economic left-
right line of conﬂict.
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The left–right dimension is not the only ideological line of conﬂict that authors
have expected to matter (Gabel and Hix, 2002). The pro-/anti-integration dimen-
sion may become dominant if the main question is framed in terms of which powers
should be on the European or the national level. Pro-European groups favour
further expansion of European competences, while the Eurosceptic groups cham-
pion national sovereignty. The key question is about more or less Europe. This line
of conﬂict is of secondary importance in the Parliament (Hix and Noury, 2009) as
competence questions are in the realm of treaties between national governments
(Mair, 2003). Recent studies of the political dynamic in the EP and among voters in
eurozone member states ﬁnd that the pro-/anti-integration dimension plays an
important role in structuring decision-making on economic issues (Katsanidou
and Otjes, 2016; Otjes and van der Veer, 2016). The main party groups in the
centre accept European inﬂuence over budgetary decision-making. Eurosceptic
groups of both left and right contest this shift of competences and promise to
protect the welfare state against the ‘dictates from Brussels’. These developments
are in line with how Mair (2007) described European integration. The EU con-
strains domestic decision-making and therefore governing parties can only chose
from a limited number of policies that the EU allows. This has now been extended
to decision-making on the budget. Macro-economic policies and EU integration
have become intertwined: parties can no longer formulate alternative budgetary
policies without contesting eurozone membership (Otjes and van der Veer, 2016). It
is the EP where the constraints on the autonomy of national governments are voted
upon. It may, however, also be that this development reinforced the conﬂict
between pro-European and anti-European forces: pro-European groups do not
want to rock the boat on this issue, because it would destabilize the eurozone
economy and risk the future of the European project. This leaves the
Eurosceptic groups, who are less committed to the European project, as the only
ones to contest the issue.
H2 (European Expectation): Decision-making in the EP follows the line of conﬂict
between pro- and anti-EU integration groups.
The ﬁnal commonly observed line of conﬂict in the Parliament is the division
between the Grand Coalition and the other groups (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999).
In this view, it is not just an ideological arena in which legislators work, but an
actor that is in negotiation with Council. In some phases of decision-making S&D
and the EPP coordinate rather than compete in order to create a united front vis-a`-
vis the Council (Kreppel, 2000). The need to do so may be stronger when decision-
making is particular contentious. In order to strengthen the bargaining power of
the Parliament over the Council and to achieve a compromise with the govern-
ments, S&D and the EPP may have an interest to coordinate their positions instead
of playing out their ideological diﬀerences. Moreover, both S&D and EPP groups
are represented in national governments and therefore in the Council and may thus
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be more inclined to compromise rather than oppose their party colleagues in the
Council publicly.
H3 (Grand Coalition Expectation): Decision-making in the EP follows the line of
conﬂict between the political groups inside of and outside of the Grand Coalition.
The key argument of this study is that at diﬀerent phases of decision-making,
diﬀerent lines of conﬂict may matter more or less. We build on the work of
Kreppel (2000). This author speciﬁcally proposed a diﬀerentiation between the
ﬁrst reading on the one hand and the second reading and conciliation stage on
the other. Groups of the left and the right would allow their ideological diﬀerences
to show themselves in the ﬁrst reading while during the seconding reading and
conciliation stage, the Grand Coalition would be more pronounced. This is because
the EP needed to form a united front vis-a´-vis the Council of Ministers (Kreppel,
2000). We expect that the basic logic of diﬀerentiation during early phases of the
legislative cycle and consensus during later phases of the legislative cycle still holds.
However, since Kreppel (2000), the nature of decision-making in the EP has chan-
ged: with the Treaty of Lisbon, co-decision became the dominant legislative
procedure, constraining it to act as responsible legislator. At the same time,
decision-making has been sped up and second readings and conciliation procedures
are far less common. Today, the plurality of legislative procedures are closed in the
ﬁrst reading (Costa, 2013).
We argue that the basic logic of Kreppel has been reinforced under the new
modus operandi of the EP, but that the diﬀerent phases of decision-making are
now already displayed during ﬁrst reading. The institutional context reaﬃrms the
central place of parliamentary committees in the decision-making process, where
ideological diﬀerences are displayed and compromises built (Bendjaballah, 2011;
Longley and Davidson, 1998; Ringe, 2010; Settembri and Neuhold, 2009). Ripoll
Servent (2012) showed how diﬃcult it is for a committee to reconcile competition
and consensus: even though the confrontation over policy values still hold, a com-
mittee displayed consensual behaviour both internally and in negotiations with the
Council, leading to the formation of a Grand Coalition. Under co-decision, Ripoll
Servent (2012: 68) argued, ‘the EP had less room for radicalism and ended up with
more centripetal outcomes’. These constraints are even more pronounced in times
of crisis, where it is ideologically divided, but at the same time needs to reaﬃrm its
role as co-legislator.
Nevertheless, even though the EP has to adapt to a new institutional context,
conﬂicts over policy issues cannot be expected to disappear. We argue that policy
conﬂicts still play a major role in EP decision-making, but are settled earlier in
the process. Transposing Kreppel’s logic to a shorter time frame, we expect that the
debates in the informal decision-making before the committee stage and during the
committee stage are more politicized (along the left–right dimension). However, we
expect the importance of left–right polarization to decrease sharply when moving
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to the plenary stage. We expect ideological conﬂicts to dominate earlier states
of the legislative process but MEPs to overcome their ideological diﬀerences in
order to reach an agreement with the Council. Hence, the Grand Coalition should
be stronger at the plenary stage compared to the committee stage. Therefore, we
expect that the patterns introduced above matter more (and less) at diﬀerent points
in time:
H4 (Left-Right Timing Expectation): Decision-making in the EP follows the left-right
dimension more during the informal pre-committee and committee phase than during
the plenary vote.
H5 (Grand Coalition Timing Expectation): Decision-making in the EP follows the
Grand Coalition logic more during the plenary vote than during the informal
pre-committee and committee phase.
Lines of conflict for the Two-Pack
We examine these theoretical expectations for the case of the Two-Pack. It consists
out of two legislative regulations on European economic governance: a regulation
on enhanced surveillance of member states whose ﬁnancial stability is at risk, and a
regulation concerning oversight on member states’ economic and budgetary poli-
cies.1 The Commission presented both proposals in November 2011 and the
responsible committee brought it to the plenary in June 2012. The negotiations
took another 11 months. The Council adopted the Two-Pack in May 2013. The
two proposals contributed to the Europeanization of economic governance by
strengthening the monitoring processes of national economies at the European
level through the Commission and the Council. The Two-Pack regulations were
the last two parts of a general reform of the European Economic governance of the
eurozone, following the reinforced Stability and Growth Pact of 2011 (the Six-
Pack). Moreover, the Two-Pack dealt with similar issues as the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). Both the treaty and the Two-
Pack set limits to the structural deﬁcit a member state could have, and deal with the
surveillance by the Commission of national economic policies.
We select the Two-Pack as a ‘crucial case’ to test our expectations (Gerring, 2004).
In the case of the Two-Pack there are suﬃcient reasons to expect each of the three
dynamics, left–right, pro-/anti-integration and Grand Coalition, to be dominant.
First, it was a major piece of economic legislation during the eurocrisis. Decision-
making on key economic issues is generally expected to lead to a strong left–right
polarization (Hix et al., 2007). The question MEPs faced when debating the Two-
Pack can be understood in left–right terms: they could choose between a ﬁscally
disciplined EU which would implement austerity programmes in order to re-gain the
trust of the international ﬁnancial markets, or they could opt to expand public
expenditure on the national level in order to reignite economic growth. Therefore,
one may expect the left–right dynamic to dominate in the decision-making.
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Second, there may also be reasons to expect a strong division between the pro-
and anti-European groups on this economic issue. The package also proposed a
major shift in responsibility between national governments and the European
Commission. The legislation had important implications for the national econo-
mies as it introduced the ‘European semester’, coordinating Member States budget-
ary plans at the European level (Chalmers, 2012; Bauer and Becker, 2014).
Therefore, the pro-/anti-integration dimension may structure decision-making:
do MEPs want more European control over budgetary decision-making or do
they want to leave these competences to the member states? All in all, there
are strong reasons to expect ideological polarization, either left–right or pro-/
anti-integration, on this major policy package.
Third, the Grand Coalition may also structure decision-making (Kreppel and
Tsebelis, 1999). When bargaining on this highly salient policy package the EP faced
another veto player, in the form of the Council. In this speciﬁc case, there may have
been more reasons for the EP to present a united front. The intergovernmental
mode of decision-making has become more important in response to the eurocrisis
(Fabbrini, 2013, 2015; Majone, 2014). For instance, the TSCG was decided on
outside the legal EU framework, leaving the Parliament aside (Auel and Ho¨ing,
2014; Schwarzer, 2012). The EP had declared its opposition against the TSCG, in
part, because it put decision-making outside of its own control. The Two-Pack was
introduced using the ordinary legislative procedure. The legislation was conten-
tious as it integrated provisions of the TSCG in the Two-Pack. MEPs feared a
Council veto if the text of the Two-Pack deviated from the TSCG (Roger, 2016).
Therefore, the case reﬂects the dilemma that MEPs oppose each other on
controversial content, but need to act in order to prevent the Council from
overruling them.
Our choice to study the Two-Pack has limits for the generalizability of the
results. This is an extreme case: the pressure to see a left–right, pro-/anti-integra-
tion or Grand Coalition decision-making pattern may be more limited in other
cases; however, it is an ideal opportunity to explore what structures decision-
making in the Parliament under extreme circumstances and how diﬀerent lines of
conﬂicts evolve throughout the entire legislative process.
This article employs multiple sources of data and both qualitative and quanti-
tative methods to determine which lines of conﬂict structured the decision-making
process. We will trace the dominant line of conﬂict in the decision-making on the
Two-Pack in three steps, moving backwards in time: ﬁrst, we will use regression
analysis to determine which lines of conﬂict mattered during the ﬁnal votes
concerning the Two-Pack. Second, we will examine the committee debate that
preceded the vote using manual text analysis to ﬁnd out what structured these
debates. Finally, we will study the coalition formation process that preceded the
actual committee debate using interviews with key players. It is important to note
that the analyses employ diﬀerent methodologies, choosing the appropriate method
for the kind of data that is available and that the results are not directly
comparable.
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Voting patterns in the EP
On 12 March 2013, the Parliament voted on the Two-Pack in two votes. The MEPs
had dealt with the amendments in the committee stage. This only left the votes on
the entire bill for the plenary. We will consider here what determined the voting
behaviour of individual MEPs in these two votes. We expected that MEPs follow
the left–right dimension, the pro-/anti-integration dimension, or the Grand
Coalition-opposition line. We include three control variables: whether or not the
national party of the MEP was in the national government (and therefore in the
Council) at the time of the vote, as they might be more inclined to vote in favour.
We also include the size of the national debt of the MEP’s member state, as MEPs
from these countries may be less inclined to accept European budgetary controls.
Finally, we added a control variable measuring whether the MEP is from a country
that the measure aﬀects (i.e. in the eurozone).
We draw on VoteWatch (2014) for the data on the individual MEPs’ voting
decisions, while the EP website provides the party membership information. The
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) is used for the national parties’ ideological left–
right and anti-/pro-integration positions (Bakker et al., 2012).2 The ParlGov data-
base (Do¨ring and Manow, 2012) is used to assess whether the MEP’s national party
was in government at the time of the vote. The information on the national debt is
extracted from EuroStat (2015). We recoded all variables to score between 0 and 1
for reasons of comparability.3
For both votes, we run two separate logistic regression models (Table 1). For the
ﬁrst model, we analyse what variables contribute to a chance of voting ‘yea’ (rather
than voting ‘nay’ or voting abstain). We ﬁnd similar patterns for both votes. Most
support is found for the European Expectation: the chances of casting a favourable
vote for the two proposals increases considerably when an MEP’s national party
position is more in favour of European integration. As for the Economic
Expectation, we ﬁnd that although the left–right dimension did appear to matter
in the voting decisions of MEPs, it did so to a much lesser extent than the European
dimension did.
The Grand Coalition expectation stated that the decision-making in the EP
would divide Grand Coalition from the other parties in general, and the Grand
Coalition Timing Expectation stated that the Grand Coalition would be particu-
larly strong during plenary voting. We ﬁnd mixed support for these expectations.
In the ﬁrst vote, the Grand Coalition does explain variation in voting, however, the
eﬀect is much smaller than both the European integration and the left–right dimen-
sion and no longer signiﬁcant for the second vote. Grand Coalition membership
did not matter in this ﬁnal phase of decision-making. Still, 98% of all Grand
Coalition MEPs (who therefore belong to either the S&D or the EPP) voted in
favour of the Two-Pack legislation. Conversely, on average 38% of non-Grand
Coalition MEPs voted against. The reason that we ﬁnd little support for the Grand
Coalition Expectation is because there is a ‘grander’ coalition, which united all pro-
European integration MEPs in favour4 and all anti-European integration MEPs
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against the legislation. Whether or not the MEP is from a eurozone member state
had a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect in both models. It is easier to vote ﬁscal dis-
cipline when it does not apply to your country. The other two variables were not
signiﬁcant.
What do these ﬁndings mean? Both votes dealt with policy that boiled down to
extending the powers of the Commission. Although the votes deal with an
economic issue, the key issue in the proposal appears to be the question of the
competences of the EU, in the form of the enhanced enforcement mechanism, as
the vote followed the European integration dimension rather than the left–right
dimension.
The two votes we analyse in this article clearly deviate from the existing litera-
ture. Overall, the dominant dimension of the EP is the left–right dimension (Hix
et al., 2007), especially on economic issues (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). Our ﬁnd-
ings are in line with more recent research on the EP (Otjes and van der Veer, 2016),
that show that the European integration dimension became much more important
for votes on all economic issues in the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The results
indicate that the Parliament adapted to the crisis context, and behave as ‘respon-
sible legislator’: to reach a compromise with the Council, it managed it to overcome
Table 1. Logistic regression analysis of roll-call voting.
Vote 1 Vote 2







































***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
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the left–right conﬂict. A ‘Grander Coalition’ pattern dominated the vote, with all
the pro-European political groups voting in favour.5
Patterns in parliamentary debates
The reports voted at the plenary stage already reﬂect compromises found at the
committee level (Ringe, 2010). Here, we may ﬁnd diﬀerent patterns than in the ﬁnal
vote. We analyse the committee debates on the Two-Pack that took place in the
Committee on Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs (ECON) in the period of January–
March 2012. These debates include an initial exchange of views on the two
legislative proposals and debates on the amended draft reports. Gauze`s (EPP)
and Ferreira (S&D) were rapporteurs and spokespersons from all main party
groups were present and participated (ALDE, ECR, EPP, Greens/EFA, GUE/
NGL, S&D).
We transcribed the English interpretation available in video format from the
Parliament website. We coded each sentence in the debate manually. A sentence is a
string of words ending with a full stop, question mark, exclamation mark, semi-
colon or colon. We employed four codes. The ﬁrst code captured whether the
sentence included left-wing content advocating of an active role of the government
in the economy, in the form of nationalization of economic sectors, higher taxes,
more market regulation, increased government spending and a maintaining the
welfare state. The second code discerned whether the sentences included right-
wing content, by which we mean a limited role for government in the economy,
privatization of government enterprises, lower taxes, less market regulation, spend-
ing cuts, deﬁcit reduction, ﬁscal discipline, austerity and welfare state reform.
Third, we coded whether a statement was pro-European, that is advocating the
transfer of sovereignty or competences to supranational European institutions and
preferring Community law over intergovernmental treaties. Finally, we coded
whether a statement was anti-European, i.e. advocating maintaining or returning
sovereignty or competences at/to the national level. We only coded sentences that
express a policy position those that express (dis)agreement with the legislation, a
desire to change or maintain the status-quo or describe a situation using normative
(positive or negative) wording. We exclude sentences that make factual statements.
Two experienced coders coded all 1125 sentences. Disagreements about the inter-
pretation of the text between the coders were resolved through discussions. One
hundred and ninety sentences were given a left or right position, and 156 sentences
were given a pro- or anti-EU position.6 We make scales that subtract left from
right-wing statements and pro- from anti-EU statements, respectively.7
Figure 1 shows the positions of the speakers in a two-dimensional model with a
left/right and a pro-/anti-integration dimension. There is a cluster of two speakers
from GUE/NGL in the left-wing Eurosceptic quadrant. One S&D MEP who is on
the border between pro- and anti-EU joins them. These three were critical of the
Two-Pack. In the centre, there is a cluster of MEPs from the S&D, ALDE and
Greens/EFA, including the two rapporteurs. These MEPs generally supported the
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proposal but proposed changes in a left-wing, pro-European direction, such as
pooling state debt, a bigger role for Parliament or a balance between austerity
and growth. Two MEPs from the EPP (on the border between pro- and anti-
EU) and one MEP from the ECR form the ﬁnal cluster. These speakers mainly
opposed the changes the second group proposed and they endorsed ﬁscal
discipline.8
What is crucial about this analysis is that in the committee the Two-Pack was
discussed along both dimensions: on the one hand, there is a discussion about ﬁscal
discipline versus growth. Here the S&D, Greens and GUE/NGL stand on one side,
and the ECR and EPP on the on the other side with the ALDE in the centre.
On the other hand, there is a debate over sovereignty. Here we ﬁnd the Greens,
ALDE and most S&D members, endorsing further transfer of sovereignty.

























Figure 1. Positions of speakers in the committee debates.
Note: Characters are parties: circles are EPP MEPs; diamonds represent GUE; plus-signs represent
ALDE, crosses represent Greens, upwards pointing triangles PES and downwards pointing tri-
angles represent ECR.
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The GUE/NGL, the ECR and the EPP were sceptical about this. The scepticism
of the EPP was limited to transfer of sovereignty further than the original
proposal.
Overall, both dimensions matter equally. The data thus provides considerable
evidence for the Economic and the European Expectation. The EPP and S&D are
not united in the committee debates, in contrast to the Grand Coalition
Expectation. Both the left–right and pro-/anti-integration lines of conﬂict were
present in the committee debates, but did not determine voting behaviour: the
MEPs prioritized compromising in voting over policy conﬂicts that they showed
in the committee. As we will see below, the compromises were negotiated in infor-
mal negotiations that accompanied the committee meetings.
Interviews with key participants
In the debate stage the European and economic dimensions played a role: the
Eurosceptic left attacked the Commission proposal; the pro-European left pro-
posed to alter the legislation. The government parties of the right opposed that.
Various informal meetings accompanied the committee meetings: committee mem-
bers of the same political group meet in working groups where amendments pro-
posed by shadow rapporteurs are discussed; in meetings between the shadow
rapporteurs the legislative proposal is discussed and compromises are negotiated
between the political groups. We focus on the informal discussions beyond the
committee and the plenary. There, the dominant lines of conﬂict related to the con-
tent of the legislative proposals and the negotiation strategy vis-a`-vis the Council
are most likely to appear. Our analysis draws on twenty in-depth interviews con-
ducted with the negotiators of the Two-Pack and parliamentary oﬃcials involved
in the legislative process.9 As the interviews were held during the entire decision-
making process, they allow us to understand the dimensions we found at the
plenary and the committee. The following section outlines the key conﬂicts between
the political groups and analyses the negotiation process, which leads to a broad
agreement within the Parliament.
The left–right dimension dominated the debate on the Two-Pack at the begin-
ning of the negotiation process. The groups of the left opposed the groups of the
right on the deﬁcit rules, speciﬁcally on the question whether investments should be
integrated in the calculation of the public deﬁcit (Interview n28, n62, n67). The
right-wing groups advocated balancing the budget as a precondition for growth,
where the left groups argued that public investments stimulate growth (Interview
n20, n28, n39, n50, n67):
This is a fundamental diﬀerence between the political groups, especially with the S&D
and Greens, in their opinion, a proposal cannot be focussed on ﬁscal discipline solely.
It must focus on ﬁscal discipline and growth. Whereby the Commission tends to say,
we focus on ﬁscal discipline, and there are other instruments for growth (Interview
n65, own translation).
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The left-wing groups and ALDE had the feeling that European governance
solely concentrated on austerity measures, and consequently made investments
and mutualising the debt a condition for their support (Interview n39, n65, n70):
We will be very, very strict with austerity but you are not giving anything on the other
hand. You are not reinforcing the ﬁscal union, you’re not further coordinating eco-
nomic policies, you’re not giving us Eurobonds for example, you know. So, the feeling
is that it is very imbalanced [. . .] (Interview n67).
The right-wing group were opposed to any form of debt mutualization: ‘you
cannot solve the crisis by making more debt’ (Interview n30). In sum, the left–
right dimension played a major role in the negotiation.
The pro-/anti-integration dimension also played an important role. From the
perspective of the Eurosceptic MEPs, the European management of the crisis lacks
legitimacy and cannot be imposed on member states (Interview n53, n25):
This is the fundamental position of the [. . .] party, which is very eurodistant. The party
will rather say, we are against, not so much because of speciﬁc arguments but because
of their general attitude . . . they will say, we are against because it stabilizes a system
we don’t ﬁnd very attractive. (Interview n53)
The left-wing GUE/NGL and the right-wing ECR opposed any form of infringe-
ment of the budgetary sovereignty of member states (Interview n38). Within
GUE/NGL, MEPs were divided between those who opposed the EU as such
and the EU in its current form, including the proposed European economic gov-
ernance (Interview n25, n238). Within the ECR group, MEPs felt less concerned
by the debate on the Two-Pack as only two members of the group were eurozone
members (Interview n32). The Eurosceptic MEPs pointed the diﬃculties related to
a common currency and did not exclude a reform or even a retreat of member
states in ﬁnancial diﬃculties:
[. . .] the Euro has been one of the causes of the crisis, particularly the generation of the
cheap money that created bubbles and debts and all the rest of it. But there is some-
thing that they will intellectually never want to accept because accepting this is accept-
ing for the pope that God doesn’t exist or for Mister Brejnev that Marxism doesn’t
work. So it becomes something of a religion, it becomes a religious emotion and that is
also feeling with the European Parliament, lots of people dealing with this issue:
socialists, Christian democrats and liberals - at least most of them, the Greens.
(Interview n51)
In contrast, the pro-European political groups considered the Euro a fundamen-
tal step in the European integration. Therefore, they considered the protection
of the eurozone a superior objective even though they disagreed on the con-
tent of the Two-Pack. These pro-European attitudes became dominant in
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decision-making: the pro-European groups were willing to compromise even on
controversial aspects of the legislation. As the interviewees agreed, compromising
was not easy because of the left–right divisions (Interview n13, n25, n65): ‘It’s
the core of the right-left wing debate, [. . .] sometimes a compromise is not good just
to get the legislation voted’ (Interview n67). Nevertheless, driven by their pro-
European attitudes, the political groups managed to compromise at the voting
stage. The compromises were negotiated between the two big groups at the com-
mittee level. Several interviewees mentioned a possible agreement between S&D
and EPP on the Two-Pack (Interview n25, n28):
If you want to pass something and you know that you will need to have a partner,
because you don’t have within your own political group the majority to pass that
thing, then you need to approach the partner as soon as possible to make sure if I go
this way, you go this way; you are not going to diverge, but somehow at least going in
parallel and possibly converge at some time (Interview n32).
Indeed, the Parliament presidency wanted to achieve an agreement with the
Council, especially since the Council already agreed on the intergovernmental
TSCG (Interview n13, n50). As a Parliament oﬃcial argued, the Council could
easily pressure it to accept its position because of the existing the Treaty making the
Two-Pack, which dealt with similar issues than the Treaty, less important:
Let’s assume that ESM treaty is ratiﬁed, the Fiscal compact [TSCG] is ratiﬁed, they
have tools they can work on and build up. So for them, Two-Pack was maybe not, you
know, the crucial instrument. And then you could say ‘‘oh, we don’t talk with you
until you give us [. . .]’’. (Interview n13)
The Parliament aimed at integrating elements of the TSCG in secondary legisla-
tion and the political groups were more willing to compromise as even compro-
mised legislation was considered to be better than the status-quo. The EP criticized
the treaty in a resolution where it ‘expresses it doubts of the necessity of such
intergovernmental agreement, most chief objectives of which could be better and
more eﬀectively achieved through EU law’.10 The pro-European groups saw the
Two-Pack as a chance to integrate the TSCG’s provisions in European law, and to
get involved into European governance. Consequently, the rapporteurs outlined
the need to achieve a large majority boosting the bargaining power of the
Parliament in the negotiations with the Council (Interview n50, n67). The will-
ingness to transfer treaty elements into European legislation, and the determination
of the pro-European groups to agree on European responses to the crisis makes a
‘high political agreement’ on the Two-Pack probable, as mentioned by several
interviewees, involving the Grand Coalition and the Parliament presidency
(Interview n28, 32, n50).
The interviews explain the diﬀerences between the committee and plenary.
At the beginning of the process, the left–right dimension was polarized.
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However, to strengthen Parliament’s stand in the negotiation with the Council, the
two big groups made crucial compromises during the legislative process and ﬁnally
agreed on the reports. These compromise amendments were presented and dis-
cussed in the committee, where pro-European groups embraced them. The inter-
views support our ﬁndings at the voting stage: the ‘Grand Coalition’ collapsed into
the ‘Grander coalition’, as the other pro-European groups embraced the comprom-
ise that was struck by the two big groups. As they were in favour of common
European economic governance, they preferred the Two-Pack to the status-quo.
Even though they disagreed on some aspects of the legislation, their commitment to
keep the European project aﬂoat drove their positioning in the committee debates
and in the plenary vote.
The analysis of the three decision-making phases provides support for our cen-
tral argument: policy conﬂicts still occur, but the political groups – driven by the
‘Grand Coalition’ – prioritize consensus-seeking in order to reach an agreement
with the Council. The ideological conﬂicts do not disappear but are displayed in the
committee meetings. At the same time, compromises are negotiated behind the
scene. In the plenary, the pro-European parties vote united despite their internal
divisions, and to preserve the Parliament’s role as responsible co-legislator.
Conclusion
This article provided in an in-depth analysis of decision-making on the Two-Pack.
The Two-Pack moved responsibility concerning economic issues to the European
level and strengthened the ability of the European institutions to enforce budgetary
discipline in their member states. Our study provides insight into how the
Parliament decides in extreme circumstances. Did political conﬂict during this
crucial stage in the eurocrisis follow the division between the left and right (as
one may expect on economic issues)? Did it follow the division between pro-/
anti-integration parties (as the Two-Pack formed an unprecedented shift in com-
petences in the EU)? Or did it follow the line of conﬂict between the unoﬃcial
coalition of S&D and EPP and the other groups (as one may expect during con-
tentious politics)?
The three analyses showed the complexity of decision-making in the Parliament,
as in diﬀerent stages of the legislative process diﬀerent lines of conﬂict were salient.
The analysis of the two ﬁnal votes showed that the single most important deciding
factor separating ‘yea’ from ‘nay’-votes was the European dimension. This goes
in against the logic that the left–right dimension structures decision-making on
economic issues: the opposition to the Two-Pack came only from Eurosceptic
parties. We also did not ﬁnd evidence for a division between the Grand
Coalition and the other groups. Rather all pro-European groups formed a
‘Grander Coalition’.
We found that both a left–right and a pro-/anti-integration dynamic was present
in the committee. The Eurosceptic left criticized the proposal as such. MEPs from
pro-European left tried to move the proposal further in their own direction.
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The EPP with support of the ECR opposed this. The Grand Coalition of S&D and
EPP was divided between the most left and most right-wing and the most pro-EU
and most anti-EU sides of the debates.
The interviews provided a basis to explain this pattern. The disagreement
between the left and right on the economic issues at the core of the Two-Pack
were solved in a grand compromise between the grand coalition of social-
democrats and Christian-democrats. They needed to cooperate in order to oﬀer
a uniﬁed front vis-a`-vis the Council. The pro-European parties of the left and right,
inside and outside of the Grand Coalition accepted the compromise in order to
ensure the stability of the eurozone, a political project that is on the long-term more
important to them than the short-term policy goals they were divided over. In the
ﬁnal vote, all pro-European parties backed the comprise, leaving opposition to the
Eurosceptic left and right. These parties opposed a shift in a further sovereignty to
save a political system that they were not particularly positive about.
What does our case study teach us beyond the borders of this single case?
We add to the existing literature in two ways. First, it shows us that economic
issues should not be equated with the left–right dimension. When the question of
transferring sovereignty to the European level is added to the decision-making,
economic issues can gain a European dimension. This article stands in line with
a number of studies (Katsanidou and Otjes, 2015; Otjes and van der Veer, 2016)
that show that the decision-making during the European sovereign debt crisis did
not just follow a left–right pattern but that it divided pro- and anti-EU integration
parties as well.
Our research helps to explain the motivations that pro-European parties had to
back the solutions the Commission pursued and the Eurosceptic parties had to
oppose them. In the end, our interviews show that the core question is not whether
parties endorse a shift in sovereignty in principle but rather to what extent parties
are willing to put away their policy diﬀerences on the question of investment or
austerity in order to stabilize the eurozone. The Eurosceptic parties that were not
committed to the European project were unwilling to do this, but the pro-European
parties prioritized stability over policy and therefore accepted a transfer of
sovereignty.
The second contribution of this article is that it shows the value of the early
work of Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) on the Parliament. Diﬀerent dimensions are
important in particular phases of European decision-making. In the period that
they studied these were other phases in the formal decision-making by the plenary
with legislative proposals going through multiple rounds between Council and the
Parliament. In early votes the S&D and the EPP would emphasize their ideological
diﬀerences, but in later votes the Grand Coalition would compromise. Here, we
uncovered the same pattern of polarization and compromise that Kreppel and
Tsebelis (1999) found in the informal decision-making and the committee stage
before the ﬁnal vote. In line with Ripoll Servent’s (2012) argument, we identiﬁed
that the patterns were reinforced with the extension of co-decision: even though
policy conﬂicts hold, the Parliament choses to behave as ‘responsible legislator’.
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Finally, our analysis shows that any hopes for ‘democratic politics’ should still
be treated with caution as the constraints in the inter-institutional bargaining pro-
cess always push for EPs unity, with the risk to sacriﬁce policy issues (Ripoll
Servent, 2013). This is especially true in the eurocrisis as the resurgence of inter-
governmental decision-making came at the expense of parliamentary participation.
The results suggest that crisis moments do not lead to politicization, but rather
further strengthen necessity of compromise. The article points a dilemma: in times
of (politicized) crisis, the institutional setting constrains the Parliament even more.
The dominance of intergovernmental decision-making modus makes the EP a vul-
nerable actor. To face this ‘full aﬃrmation of the intergovernmental approach of
European governance’ (Fabbrini, 2014: 1) in the eurocrisis, MEPs are constrained
to compromise and hence may be tempted to neglect substantive demands. The
study, however, provides evidence that the party competition nevertheless matters
in the legislative process; from this view, the EPs vote is not a sign of ‘misrepre-
sentation’ (Rose and Borz, 2013), but may be interpreted as the outcome of a party
battle at the committee stage which lead into a compromise position, guaranteeing
the representation of EU voters in the inter-institutional bargaining process.
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Notes
1. ‘The proposal for a regulation of the EP and of the Council on common provisions for
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive
deficit of the Member States in the euro area’ and ‘The proposal for a regulation of the
EP and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of
Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their
financial stability in the euro area’.
2. Experts scored parties on a general left–right dimension from 0 (most left-wing) to 10
(most right-wing). For the EU-integration dimension, this ranges from 1 (most anti-EU)
to 7 (most pro-EU). The CHES lacked information for 11% (first vote) and 12% (second
vote) of ‘yea’-voters and 16% of ‘nay’-voters. If anything, this might underestimate the
role of ideology within the voting because the extreme parties voted nay and these are the
parties, which have a higher chance of not being included in the CHES.
3. Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides an overview of the variables.
4. Grand coalition membership and pro-/anti-integration positions correlate strongly:
r¼ 0.53.
5. We ran an additional model in which we interacted the MEPs’ member states’ budget
deficits with their EU-integration position. We find an interaction these two. The effect of
pro/anti-integration dimension weakens if the MEP comes from a more indebted
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member state. This means that ideological concerns matter less when the country an
MEP comes from is more likely to be directly affected by the legislation.
6. We considered counting sentences that concerned interinstitutional bargaining but a
pilot coding project yielded no meaningful results.
7. Table A2 in the Online Appendix shows the correlations between the percentages of
sentences devoted to these four categories per speaker. Those who make left-wing state-
ments tend not to make right-wing statements and those who make pro-EU statements
tend not to make anti-EU statements. These scales are justified from a scaling perspec-
tive (H¼ 0.84 for the left/right scale and H¼ 0.73 for the pro-/anti-integration scale).
8. Table A3 in the Online Appendix shows the correlation between party’s CHES position
and their membership of national government or the grand coalition. It shows the
external validity of the results.
9. The list of interviews and the coding scheme are available from the authors. Interviews
were conducted with ten MEPs ((shadow) rapporteurs, active MPs in the committee
debate) and ten EP officials (political group and MEP assistants, EP secretariat officials)
who were involved in the Two-Pack negotiation. The interviews took place during the
committee negotiation process on the Two-Pack. Representatives of all political groups
were interviewed (Roger, 2016).
10. European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2012 on the European Council of 8–9
September 2011 (2011/2546(RSP)).
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